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ABSTRACT
Barrierefreiheit is a key term in the German inclusion movement, in 
education and more generally. Sometimes translated as ‘accessibility’, it 
refers not just to absence of barriers but to freedom from barriers, which 
in turn indicates a significant social and ethical component. It signals 
an active, conscious intervention by agents, a consequence of agentic 
commitment towards crossing borders and overcoming boundaries. 
In this regard, this article seeks to provide an epistemological analysis 
and illustration of what ‘inclusive’, ‘barrier-free’ education means, by 
examining three ideas within social epistemology: epistemological 
access, epistemic paternalism and epistemic justice. In so doing, it 
articulates a position that might be called ‘context-sensitive realism’, 
which cautions against not only constructivist theoretical leanings but 
also the anti-individualism that characterises a substantial portion of 
the inclusive education literature.
Introduction: the idea of Barrierefreiheit
Barrierefreiheit is a key term in the German inclusion movement, in education and more 
generally. Sometimes translated as ‘accessibility’, it refers not just to absence of barriers but 
also to freedom from barriers, which in turn signals a significant social and ethical compo-
nent. It indicates an active, conscious intervention by agents, a consequence of agentic 
commitment towards crossing borders and overcoming boundaries. Barrierefreiheit is often 
understood to be a basic enabling condition for inclusion, which refers to people with and 
without relevant disabilities living, learning and working together as a matter of course. (The 
notion of ‘relevant’ is important here, because everyone has strengths, as well as weaknesses, 
that arguably require some degree of attention.1) Yet, there is a significant distinction 
between inclusion and freedom from barriers. Whereas inclusion is seen as never complete, 
as a never-ending process, with inclusive institutions at best approximating a perfect or end 
state (see Grosche 2015), Barrierefreiheit sometimes also seems to portray such an ideal 
condition or state. Barriers include everything from a lack of ramps or chairlifts to difficult 
or incomprehensible texts. But barriers also include mental barriers. These take the form of 
preconceptions and prejudices towards the disabled or impaired on the part of those without 
relevant disabilities. Mental barriers also include a lack of awareness or appreciation of the 
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kinds of obstacles encountered by many people (including limitations because of social 
origin, or language and cultural barriers) and of how these can be overcome. So a barrier-free 
state would be one of mindfulness and empathy, over and above the absence of physical 
obstacles, borders and boundaries. Barrierefreiheit is a cross-sectional theme that touches 
on multitudinous aspects and areas of our daily existence, how we get around, how we 
communicate and how we get along with one another.
To illustrate the epistemological significance of ‘translation’ and ‘border crossing’ (two 
sub-themes of the 2016 INPE conference theme, ‘Philosophy as translation and the under-
standing of other cultures’), and to explore its educational implications, I will focus on the 
demands imposed by the accommodation of those with disabilities. What is involved, epis-
temologically, in inclusive, ‘barrier-free’ education? Other pertinent questions are: Could 
inclusion conceivably violate the norms of educational justice?2 To what extent do those 
with cognitive disabilities benefit from inclusive, barrier-free educational practices? And 
what, if anything, does inclusion offer those without relevant disabilities? These are also 
questions that turn on the epistemological issue of understanding other cultures. A quick 
response to the last question might be that, at the very least, many solutions developed for 
the sake of Barrierefreiheit also benefit those without disabilities. Thus, ramps and lifts help 
not only those with temporary and permanent impairments but also parents with prams, 
young children and the aged. What is required by people with learning difficulties – like 
texts in accessible language and unambiguous accompanying illustrations (here we encoun-
ter the normative impulse behind ‘translation’) – will also benefit those with a weak grasp 
of the language or geographic location in question, and those who are illiterate or barely 
literate. An additional, albeit more self-serving, consideration is that people without present 
impairments may, at a later stage in their lives, benefit from the absence of barriers. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, those without relevant handicaps are likely to develop a 
greater sensitivity towards those who are so disabled and to increase their ability to take a 
pro-active role in a world of difference, diversity and heterogeneity. Martha Nussbaum, 
referring to education and inclusion in particular, claims that the practice of ‘mainstreaming’ 
children with disabilities is defensible because ‘of the benefit to the mentally disabled child, 
who will be given more incentives to develop cognitively and who may be less likely to be 
stigmatised as type apart’ (Nussbaum 2006, 205). It is also defensible on the grounds of ‘the 
benefit it offers to so-called normal children, who learn about humanity and its diversity by 
being in a classroom with a child who has unusual impairments’ (ibid.). These children ‘learn 
to think for themselves, their own weaknesses, and the variety of human capability, in a new 
way’ (Nussbaum 2006, 206).
Inclusion, then, cannot function without Barrierefreiheit. When and where there are obsta-
cles, participation in social, cultural and political life is significantly impaired. The ethical 
dimension of inclusion and barrier-free education is only one of several areas of possible 
philosophical investigation. My concern here is less with the ethical than with the episte-
mological dimension, which nonetheless retains a bearing on the question of educational 
justice. This paper attempts to provide an analysis of the following three epistemological 
aspects,3 both with regard to the conceptions of inclusion justice within education, and in 
terms of the connections and tensions between them:
•  epistemological access (Morrow 2007; see also Lotz-Sisitka 2009; Bekker 2013; Walton 
2013; Walton and Bekker 2013),
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•  epistemic paternalism (Goldman 1992) and
•  epistemic justice (Fricker 2007).
Epistemological access
There is a tendency to associate inclusive education with learners with various kinds of 
disability, especially those with ‘special educational needs’ (Walton and Bekker 2013, 442). 
This is a rather problematic label. As Elizabeth Walton and Tanya Bekker have argued, a 
learner diagnosed with cerebral palsy (which is commonly identified as a ‘special need’) may 
require considerably less help from her teacher than a young person who heads a household 
(which is not usually considered a ‘special need’; 458). Less narrowly conceived, however, 
inclusive education targets the various ways in which marginalisation and disadvantage, 
generally, occur in educational contexts and situations – in other words, all kinds of exclusion 
from those opportunities that ought to characterise access to learning. Among other things, 
barrier-free pedagogy might be understood as providing learners with epistemological 
access. In other words, and importantly, inclusive education is ‘an issue of how epistemo-
logical access is enabled or constrained by the pedagogical choices we make’ (ibid.). 
According to Walton and Bekker:
In inclusive education discourse, ‘exclusion’ is used to describe not only the physical non-pres-
ence of children, but also the variety of factors that impede full and fair access to and partici-
pation in school activities … access to the curriculum, learning and teacher attention, access 
to peer and social interactions … and access to school resources, extra-curricular activities and 
participation in school traditions. (2013, 450)
The term ‘epistemological access’ was first coined by Morrow (2009, iv), the late South 
African educational philosopher who played a significant role in post-apartheid educational 
reform. Beginning with the idea that ‘teaching is conceptually linked to the idea of access’, 
Morrow made a conceptual distinction between two kinds of access not commonly distin-
guished from each other, formal and epistemological access. Formal access is held to be ‘a 
matter of access to the institutions of learning, and it depends on factors such as admission 
rules, personal finances, and so on’ (Morrow 2007, 2). Epistemological access, on the other 
hand, is access to the goods that institutions distribute to those it formally admits and, as 
the main good distributed by educational institutions, to knowledge – which must be under-
stood here as encompassing all kinds of practical and theoretical knowledge. Morrow con-
siders formal access to be important in the light of South Africa’s ‘history of unjustifiable 
institutional exclusions’ (ibid.). Epistemological access on the other hand, is ‘what the game 
is about. One way of characterising teaching is to say that it is the practice of enabling epis-
temological access’ (ibid.; see also 8, note 6, and 39).
From all this it follows that the question, ‘Epistemological access for whom?’ (Walton and 
Bekker 2013, 443), appears to receive the rather uninteresting answer, ‘Everyone who is 
educable’. But this by no means renders the concept redundant. Given that education and, 
in particular, classrooms are increasingly characterised by diversity and heterogeneity of 
learners (commonly with vastly different features, competences, learning needs and learning 
barriers), it is clear that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach does not (any longer) meet current chal-
lenges (ibid.; see also Walton 2013, 508).4 This will also have a bearing on the breadth and 
depth of the access in question. On the other hand, responsive educators also need to protect 
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themselves from pedagogical paralysis: if the uniqueness of learners necessitates, respec-
tively, unique teaching strategies, then an overemphasis of the individual could soon lead 
to a culture of overemphasising difference. It could be argued that it is not so much a matter 
of diversity in general but rather of emphasis on pedagogically relevant differences; that is, 
of judging when and to what extent individual and group differences are pedagogically 
significant, of planning lessons that are meant to provide access for all, etc. The quality of 
pedagogy, i.e. how educators work with knowledge, can be seen either as overcoming bar-
riers or as preventing access. Heila Lotz-Sisitka (2009), building on Morrow’s ideas and on 
the basis of several case studies, lists several ways in which teaching practice can constrain 
epistemological access, or retain existing barriers:
•  through teacher’s failure to bridge the divide between the concrete and the abstract, 
or between everyday knowledge and school knowledge;
•  through teachers’ failure to interpret the demands of set curricular standards and sub-
sequent limitation of the scope and level of access in relation to these standards;
•  through reliance on teacher knowledge only, which may in itself be limited, and subse-
quent limitation of the scope and depth of access to new knowledge; and
•  through inadequate feedback on tasks, and subsequent failure to enable learners to 
deepen their understanding or address misconceptions (see also Walton and Bekker 
2013, 452).
In the remainder of this section on epistemological access, I discuss three problems I have 
identified in the relevant literature, pertaining to the more or less explicit endorsement of 
a constructivist conception of knowledge, its critique of individualism and the characteristics 
of the inclusive educator, respectively.
Knowledge as ‘contested’ and ‘constructed’
First, it would appear that a substantial portion of the literature on inclusion understands 
epistemological access in constructivist terms, i.e. in terms of learners being ‘active partici-
pants in the construction of their knowledge’ (Bekker 2013, 467). Thus, Bekker writes:
Knowledge is frequently presented as contested (in other words, it is not presented as a fixed 
body of information, but rather as being constructed; contrasting points of view or interpre-
tations and potentially conflicting forms of knowledge are discussed) instead of as universally 
accepted by all (that is, as a one-dimensional body of truth). (476)
The idea is that substantive conversation is needed in multicultural or intercultural con-
texts, where knowledge is seen as emanating from specific social and cultural histories rather 
than as ‘fixed’. From an inclusive education perspective, Michel Foucault’s critique of episte-
mological hegemony and his analysis of how knowledge and truth are always part of systems 
of power are considered significant (Bekker; personal communication):
Each society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one 
to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1984, 73)
At least two concerns arise in this regard. The ideas of ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘“general 
politics” of truth’ not only indicate a category mistake (in treating epistemological matters 
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as necessarily inseparable from matters of social justice), but they are also dangerously close 
to relativism about truth. Is Foucault able to make these sorts of assertions consistently? If 
he is correct, then this is so only on the basis of his particular society’s regime or ‘general 
politics’ of truth – in which case the question arises why others (i.e. those who do not belong 
to his particular society) ought to find his analysis compelling. If he is saying, however, that 
this particular truth holds transsocietally, then he has in effect opened the door to the 
(strong) possibility of there being other truths that are not confined to the contexts of society 
or culture. Either way, then, this account loses much of its intended force.
What is missing in the pertinent literature is an account, let alone a critical analysis, of the 
concept of knowledge. An examination of this idea may well demonstrate that the concep-
tualisation of constructivism as an epistemology is highly problematic. The most significant 
problems are posed by relativism (both about knowledge and about truth) and by construc-
tivism’s difficulty to distinguish between knowledge and mere belief, between science and 
non-science (especially dogma and superstition). In addition, the common assertion that 
knowledge is ‘contested’ seems to draw its strength entirely from this lack of definition and 
conceptual clarity. Once an account of the different uses of the term ‘knowledge’ and cir-
cumspect definitions is furnished, much of the putative basis for ‘contestation’ will have been 
eroded. By the time students have completed their undergraduate teacher training, many 
have been thoroughly indoctrinated with constructivism. According to Duffy and 
Cunningham (1996), and also Windschitl (2002), one of the most difficult underpinnings of 
constructivism for educators to embrace is that there are no universal truths and that con-
structivism by its very nature is not compatible with more objective forms of knowing. No 
wonder, one might respond, since this can only be apprehended as either a ‘universal truth’ 
itself, or in terms of an ‘objective form of knowing’. It would appear, then, that in an important 
respect constructivism is self-undermining: either there are no universal truths (or objective 
forms of knowing), except this particular one; or the statement in question does not itself 
constitute a universal truth, or objective form of knowing. More to the point, it should be 
noted that the logic of neither inclusion (and Barrierefreiheit) nor epistemological access 
requires adoption of a constructivist epistemology. However, this is not the place for a 
detailed critique. My sketchy remarks here are unlikely to persuade anyone that construc-
tivism, for example, should be rejected. They merely serve to underline my misgivings about 
bestowing special status in education on a theoretical orientation that is deeply problematic. 
As Lotz-Sisitka claims, ‘education has a critical role to play in preparing children to live in the 
world’ (Lotz-Sisitka 2009, 71; emphasis added). This arguably requires that those who so 
prepare children live there, too. Frankly, I cannot see constructivism making a substantial 
contribution to this preparation process, neither with regard to children nor those with 
relevant impairments.
The ideology of individualism
Moreover, there is a tendency in the inclusive education literature to relate the ‘deficit way 
of understanding difference’ to ‘the ideology of individualism’ (Walton & Bekker 2013, 454). 
Research that explores individual experiences of disability has been subject to considerable 
critique. For example, Michael Oliver distinguishes between the individual and the social 
model of disability (Oliver 1990, 2004). He rejects the individual (or ‘medical’) approach 
because it locates the ‘problem’ in individual deficit and sees its causes as ‘stemming from 
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the functional limitations of psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability’ 
(Oliver 1990, 3). It therefore, he claims, does not take into account the structural (economic, 
environmental and cultural) barriers and exclusions that people with disabilities face. The 
argument is that making disability a personal or individual tragedy, requiring individual 
intervention, obviates the need to consider disabling practices and attitudes in society (or 
the classroom) as a whole. McCall and Skrtic (2009) contend, similarly, that collective action 
against oppression is forestalled by a focus on individual ‘problems’.
It is perhaps ironic that Oliver’s own approach is rather exclusive and judgemental. For 
example, he states that he does ‘not intend to engage with the disapproving analyses that 
have been offered from those outside the [Disability Studies] Movement or in other parts 
of the academy’ (Oliver 2004, 18). His point that ‘the cultural environment in which we all 
grow up usually sees impairment as unattractive and unwanted’ (4) certainly deserves to be 
taken seriously. Nevertheless, while he may be correct in stating that ‘parents’ feelings 
towards, and treatment of, a child born with an impairment are dependent upon what they 
have learned about disability from the world around them’ (4), the following conclusion 
appears to be counter-intuitive, to say the least: 
people who acquire impairment later in life have already been immersed in the personal tragedy 
viewpoint and it is not therefore surprising that many of these individuals find it difficult to know 
how to respond in any other way. (5)
 So, to view impairment acquired later in life as a personal tragedy is mistaken? And the 
disabled who do view their own condition in this way are wrong? Oliver seems to proceed 
by way of bald assertion here. In fact, there seems to be a false dichotomy at work in his 
binary distinction. Focusing exclusively on the social model of disability may entail losing 
sight of the individual who is disabled. It is not a matter of locating the ‘problem’ of disability 
in the individual but rather of individual recognition, of nurturing a sense of belonging in 
the individual and making sure that s/he does indeed ‘belong’.
Walton agrees that ‘inclusion has to be about an educational responsiveness to individ-
uality’, but also thinks that ‘when individual differences are made a major focus, teachers 
cannot imagine that they can teach more than one child at a time’ (personal 
communication):
Individualism assumes that if children work hard enough and apply themselves they should 
be successful. This shifts the blame for lack of school success onto the individual child as either 
being ‘unable’ to succeed given an inner deficit or ‘unwilling’ to succeed in terms of effort and 
application. (Walton and Bekker 2013, 454)
This characterisation of individualism seems to be mistaken. In fact, individualism by its 
very nature takes difference and individual capability seriously and disavows the deficit 
conception highlighted above. After all, disabled children (for example) do not constitute a 
faceless class: they are individuals, with varying needs and abilities. Nussbaum endorses the 
law’s ‘focus on protecting what most urgently needs protection: the claim of stigmatised 
children to be seen, and educated, as individuals’ (Nussbaum 2006, 210; see also Lewin 2007, 
34).
It follows that the attack on individualism is based on problematic assumptions. A relevant 
and legitimate target would, rather, be performativity in education, which seems to have 
the bureaucratic and pernicious streak correctly taken aim at above.
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Epistemological access and the virtues of the inclusive educator
Finally, providing a list of personal features or characteristics of educators who are capable 
of enabling epistemological access does not yield an explanation of why what these edu-
cators are mediating is (ipso facto) epistemological access. According to Bekker (2013, 477), 
educators ‘who demonstrate pedagogical sensitivity and tact’ ‘show empathy’ (i.e. they ‘try 
to understand the learner’s point of view’); they ‘have a positive view of others’ (i.e. they 
‘demonstrate trust and confidence in the worth, ability and capacity for growth, development 
and learning of the learners’); they ‘have a positive view of self’ (i.e. they ‘see themselves as 
capable and have a quiet sense of confidence’); they demonstrate ‘authenticity’ (i.e. they ‘are 
genuine and real in their interactions with learners’); they ‘have a meaningful purpose and 
vision’ (i.e. they ‘are committed to helping all learners to reach their potential’); and they ‘are 
sensitive and perceptive of the needs of others’. The challenge, then, would be to match the 
virtues of the inclusive, responsive teacher and the different ways in which and levels (e.g. 
of difficulty and complexity) at which she works with and presents knowledge, how she 
thinks about, orders and sequences the knowledge she teaches and the ways in which she 
works with the knowledge of others.
Epistemic paternalism
Assuming responsibility for one’s own beliefs is only one concern among many in episte-
mology. Another concerns responsibility for the beliefs of others, through teaching, selection 
and control. This involves what Alvin Goldman calls ‘epistemic paternalism’ (Goldman 1992). 
It refers to the kind of knowledge, information or communication control that occurs in 
education and law and in various other kinds of social enterprises and relations. It means 
that certain kinds of information are often withheld or kept from people, for the benefit of 
the recipient of knowledge or information (for example, the learner).5 Goldman draws an anal-
ogy with parents who keep dangerous toys or other articles away from children, or who 
decide not to expose children to certain types of situation. A similar impulse, he says, is at 
work with shielding children, learners or people generally from certain facts or types of 
information. One might prefer to speak of ‘parentalism’ rather than ‘paternalism’. For many, 
the latter has generally derogatory associations. Not only is it usually assumed to involve 
taking care of others while limiting their freedom and responsibility, but it also suggests a 
social order in which the father is the bearer of formal authority within the family. 
(‘Maternalism’ might go some way towards correcting the explicit androcentrism here, in its 
acknowledgement of informal, crucial and usually invisible familial authority, but it has a 
similarly gender-specific connotation.) Nonetheless, for the sake of conceptual simplicity, I 
retain Goldman’s notion in what follows.
Usefully for present purposes, Goldman chooses to illustrate epistemic paternalism with 
examples from the realm of education. In particular, he mentions curriculum selection. 
Curricular materials are selected by school personnel at various levels; not only by educators, 
but also by boards of education and principals. What is involved in curriculum selection? 
Epistemic paternalism is concerned not only with the relevance, suitability and verity of what 
is taught but also with the level of cognitive and emotional ability and maturity of the learn-
ers. Most pertinent to this discussion, learners are not exposed to all possible views or ideas 
on a given subject. Not only are they generally exposed only to materials that are relevant 
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and appropriate to their level of understanding, but opinions that are regarded as false or 
indefensible are also withheld by current educational authorities.
Wondering about the need for paternalistically motivated epistemic constraints, Goldman 
asks whether epistemic paternalism is ‘really warranted’ (214). A related question is whether 
it is ‘desirable in terms of promoting truth and avoiding error’ (214–215, 220). Logically speak-
ing, epistemic paternalism is not necessary for education to occur. We could at least conceive 
of a situation where everything is taught indiscriminately, with little or no regard for its 
relevance, suitability and verity – a situation that nonetheless yields some kind of educational 
value. The more interesting question is whether epistemic paternalism is defensible, even 
desirable. The short answer seems to be – notwithstanding errors that are sometimes made 
in controlling knowledge and information – that, even with the best of intentions, it is defen-
sible. As parents and educators, we select what we deem to be of value to pass on to the 
next generation. Since none of us can reasonably hope to assess all evidence for all theses 
personally, we often depend on the authority of others. Questions of epistemic desirability 
perhaps relate more to the reasons why selection decisions are made. An important consid-
eration is that, unlike defensive teaching (see McNeil 1986) and indoctrination, epistemic 
paternalism is practiced for the benefit of learners. Thus, knowledge selection in education 
involves ‘translation’ as much as it involves dismantling barriers, for the sake of those at the 
receiving end of our pedagogical practices.
Goldman points out that epistemology has traditionally assumed that all those working 
with knowledge and justification have the same cognitive resources, skills and opportunities 
and that they operate without time constraints and the like. This is an idealised setting, he 
contends, which is endorsed neither by common sense nor by common experience.
[In] settings marked by different levels of expertise, by different opportunities for information 
gathering, by different levels of cognitive maturity and training, and by severe time constraints, 
idealized principles of communication do not apply. A social epistemology for the real world 
needs to take these constraints into account. (Goldman 1992, 224)
This is especially pertinent with regard to learners living with various kinds of disability. 
Epistemic paternalism needs to take seriously the positions, perspectives and experiences 
of those who live with impairments in a society where impairment is not considered the 
norm but is seen, rather, as ‘unattractive and unwanted’ (Oliver 2004, 4). This may help explain 
why paternalism remains epistemically warranted. A defensible paternalism that takes on 
the epistemic positions of the impaired will be likely to reflect a more accurate picture of 
social reality than an approach that assumes an idealised setting, in Goldman’s sense. I next 
turn to the idea of epistemic justice.
Epistemic justice
Broadly, epistemic justice refers to the fair and equal distribution of epistemic benefits and 
burdens: it involves due acknowledgement of individuals as knowers with corresponding 
rights and obligations. In her influential account of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker dis-
tinguishes between two types of epistemic justice, testimonial and hermeneutical justice. 
Fricker refers to them as hybrid virtues (in that they both have an intellectual and an ethical 
component) that serve to countervail or prevent epistemic (i.e. respectively, testimonial and 
hermeneutical) injustice. Although they are experienced (and may be performed) individ-
ually, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice constitute not only individual harms: they 
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originate within a social fabric of which the biases and prejudices that enliven and perpetuate 
them are a characteristic part. Contesting such injustices and harms, according to Fricker, 
requires ‘collective social political change’ (Fricker 2007, 8).
In order to bring about such change, what is required at a testimonial level is ‘reflexive 
awareness of the likely presence of prejudice’, and this ‘anti-prejudicial virtue is the virtue of 
testimonial justice’ (91-92). Testimonial justice, says Fricker, is ‘both ethical and intellectual 
in character, at once a virtue of truth and a virtue of justice’ (124). Thus, apart from being 
able to rely on the competence and sincerity of speakers (72), and apart from sensitivity 
(ibid.) and empathy (79), ‘hearers need dispositions that lead them reliably to accept truths 
and to reject falsehoods’ (115).
Like testimonial justice, hermeneutical justice is a hybrid virtue, says Fricker (174). What 
it is meant to counteract is hermeneutical injustice, which occurs when (members of certain) 
groups or communities lack the hermeneutical tools to make sense of their own social expe-
rience (146). ‘For something to be an injustice, it must be harmful but also wrongful, whether 
because discriminatory or because otherwise unfair’ (151). When there is unequal ‘herme-
neutical participation with respect to some significant areas(s) of social experience, members 
of the disadvantaged group are hermeneutically marginalised’ (153).
Given how prejudice affects various levels of credibility, this discussion raises the question 
whether the idea of epistemic (in-)justice (which, after all, in Fricker’s analysis refers to the 
epistemic situation of women and blacks in a world dominated by men and whites) is at all 
relevant to inclusion of those with impairments. Testimonial justice appears as an original 
virtue of both justice and truth. Applied to the case of inclusion, it expresses the idea that 
the influence of a possible identity prejudice (in this case, against a person with cognitive 
disability or impairment) on the part of the (non-impaired) hearer has been recognised and 
corrected. Hermeneutical justice manifests itself in the reflective-critical sensitivity of the 
(non-impaired) hearer to any reduced understanding (or any failure to comprehend) incurred 
by the speaker (in this case, the person with cognitive disability) because of a gap in the 
collective hermeneutical resources. In other words, the hearer is aware of the fact that the 
speaker’s apparent lack of understanding is ‘a function of a collective hermeneutical impov-
erishment, and he adjusts or suspends his credibility judgement accordingly’ (7).
To take a relevant example of hermeneutical injustice suggested by Emily Robertson: 
having long been excluded from the development of an available framework for articulating 
their experience, ‘recently people with intellectual disabilities have rejected the term 
‘retarded’ as a slur although the field of ‘mental retardation’ has used it for years’ (Robertson 
2013, 302). This indicates, Robertson asserts, that inclusion of the experiences and perspec-
tives of marginalised groups in knowledge production can change the conceptual landscape 
in epistemically fruitful ways’ (302).
Further questions and concluding thoughts: context-sensitive realism
This article has been concerned in the main with certain epistemological considerations 
pertaining to inclusive, barrier-free education. What possibilities for learning and the acqui-
sition of knowledge exist for those with cognitive and physical impairments? Access to 
institutions of learning is not identical to epistemological access. An additional consideration 
is that learning possibilities, as well as the mediation and acquisition of knowledge, differ 
from person to person. Given that one cannot participate or be included everywhere or 
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claim unlimited access for oneself, should one nonetheless be able to determine to what 
one has access? While perhaps desirable, this is clearly utopian. Especially in cases of limited 
autonomy and self-determination, a certain knowledge and information control is arguably 
both necessary and justified. In other words, the young and the cognitively impaired are not 
given unlimited access to knowledge and information. (Nor are any of us, for that matter, 
under any and all circumstances.) This may lead us to conclude that Barrierefreiheit, like 
inclusion, is never complete, a never-ending process, with barrier-free arrangements and 
institutions at best approximating a perfect or end state.
The controlled transfer of knowledge and information raises the question of epistemic 
justice. How ought one to accommodate the knowledge claims and the epistemic and 
cognitive abilities of those with relevant impairments? Under what circumstances can one 
speak of knowledge here? What would be the basis for inclusion within a knowledge 
community? Without being able to provide a comprehensive analysis here, I suggest that a 
context-sensitive realism offers a plausible response to these questions. It is concerned with 
a normative account: it deals with processes that ought or ought not to be called ‘knowledge’. 
In other words, ‘knowledge’ is not ambiguous between various concepts of knowledge. What 
constitutes knowledge does not fluctuate with differences in people’s cognitive abilities or 
with what their constructs, ‘regimes’ or ‘politics’ are. It does acknowledge that people do not 
have the same cognitive resources, abilities and opportunities. They do not all act or operate 
in the absence of time constraints. Their situations are characterised by different levels of 
expertise, by different opportunities to access and gather information, by different levels of 
cognitive ability, maturity and training, and by considerable disparities in time constraints. 
This insight permits us to talk of different levels of knowledge, without implying relativism. 
Barrierefreiheit is not a case of ‘anything goes’, epistemologically. The knowledge in question 
remains characterised by the pursuit of truth and the avoidance of error. A relevantly disabled 
person’s claims constitute ‘knowledge’ only if they are true. The same – obviously – goes for 
the claims of those without pertinent disabilities. Truth does not vary according to particular 
individuals, social or ethnic groups or different cultures. This serves to indicate why, as 
educators, we are more lenient in some cases than in others, but our leniency does not 
extend to condoning untruths or falsehoods.
Notes
1.  As Martha Nussbaum explains, ‘it would be progress if we could acknowledge that there really 
is no such thing as “the normal child”: instead, there are children, with varying capabilities 
and varying impediments, all of whom need individualised attention as their capabilities are 
developed’ (Nussbaum 2006, 210).
2.  In this regard, Krassimir Stojanov examines the different responses provided in terms of 
distributive justice, participatory justice and recognitory justice (Stojanov 2015).
3.  To be more precise, these are ideas within the fairly new field of social epistemology, understood 
here as concerned with the interpersonal and social practices and norms that influence and 
guide the search for knowledge.
4.  It might seem, of course, given that ‘differentiation’ and ‘personalization’ are central to the 
discourse of learning, that it has been acknowledged that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not 
desirable (I owe this consideration to Naomi Hodgson). I simply report an observation within 
the literature on epistemological access here. An obvious drawback is that many educators may 
feel simply overwhelmed by the demand to attend to each individual’s personal, differentiated 
needs, interests and capabilities. I return to this point below.
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5.  The question might be posed now whether this is not a form of construction of knowledge. 
I do not think it is: it is, rather, a matter of knowledge selection. Even if one could attach the 
notion of construction to belief and justification, one could not meaningfully connect it with 
truth – unlike the notion of selection.
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